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INTRODUCTION

According to stereotypes, the compliance officer for a large cor
poration might seem to be something like the cousin of Toby
Flenderson, the sad-sack human resources director who was the butt of
so many jokes in the television sitcom, The Office. Like Flenderson, the
compliance officer might seem to be a kind of joyless drone, constantly
offering monotonic reminders to the managers and other employees
about the rules that they have to follow, and regularly handing out
lengthy forms that need to be completed for some purpose that seems
elusive to everyone but the compliance officer. If this stereotype rings
true, it is probably because the process of assuring that a corporation's
managers, employees, and agents comply with the law seems like a
dreary adjunct to the corporation's main purpose. This stereotype begs
a question: must compliance always be understood as an unfortunate
chore or can it seem more engaging and important to the employees
and agents of a corporation?
The stereotypical conception of compliance is reinforced by
some of the fundamental assumptions about what the primary objec
tives of a corporation should be and about how a corporation should
accomplish those objectives. According to the prevailing theory of cor
porate structure, a corporation exists for the sole purpose of earning
profits for its shareholders, and all of its actions are to be directed to
ward that end. If compliance with the law is not an inherently profitmaking activity, it is to be treated as a constraint on the corporation's
efficient operation. According to this view, compliance will generally be
considered a burden that inhibits the corporation's ability to earn prof
its, and it should be discouraged except to the minimum extent
necessary.
This view of compliance does not always serve corporations
we , owever. The potential problems with the stereotypical approach
o comp lance are evident in the health care field, as corporations try to
deal with two complicated, open-ended, and ever-evolving sets of stat
utes and their attendant regulations. These two statutory schemes
™ fTn ^e Anti-Kickback statute and the False Claims Act
h itw
°r u tT^eSe statutes can apply to many transactions in the
because they are broadly framed,
SVf
and because
c e ai s o ea t care transaction are often complicated and widely
(703) 570-5264^1 wouldTk^^n? "illllgation- Roni can be reached at roni@]yourtcp.comor
deta 1 IIha^'lZa bke to hank the FAMU Law Review Team for their laser focus to
' 1 ^7 ?, ^ bettCr half' MGS' t0 be better every day.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2015); 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (2012)
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varied, it is not intuitively obvious how to make sure these rules are
being followed in any particular case. If one follows the traditional ap
proach and tries to promote compliance with these statutes by viewing
compliance as an expensive burden that should be minimized as much
as possible, the long-term risk of liability will be severe.
Assuring compliance with these statutes requires a new way of
thinking about compliance. The traditional view of compliance as a
constraint on profit-making must be replaced by a conception of com
pliance as a goal of the corporation, one that must be internalized and
valued along with the profit-making motive. To be sure, compliance
must always take a subsidiary place to profit-making as a corporate
objective, but it should be viewed as a goal of corporate action, not sim
ply as a constraint upon it. In other words, this paper will argue that
corporations should stop treating regulatory compliance as a source of
external costs that should be minimized, and that they should start
treating regulatory compliance as a legitimate corporate interest that
must be served alongside other interests.
This paper offers some suggestions about how to develop a new
way of thinking about compliance in the context of health care. It be
gins in Part I by reviewing some of the essential conceptual approaches
to corporate compliance, especially a developing concept often known
as the "New Governance." As Part I shows, it is possible to think of
legal compliance as conformity to a constraint imposed by an outsider
or as the identification of lawful behavior as a goal to be pursued in
every corporate act. Having set forth the conceptual background for
compliance, Part II discusses the specifics of the Anti-Kickback statute
and the FCA, as a basis for discussing how those statutes can play
themselves out in the context of the health care services industry. Part
III reviews a variety of different transactional circumstances in the
provision of health care services, showing how the Anti-Kickback stat
utes and the FCA can be implicated, often subtly, in a wide variety of
situations and how this implication can often lead to conflicting or con
fusing circumstances that can create real problems for any individual
who is trying to act in both a lawful and economically efficient manner.
Finally, the paper concludes by arguing that many of the insights of
the New Governance approach to compliance can be profitably applied
In the provision of health care services as a means of making compli
ance a goal of corporation action rather than a constraint upon it.
Because these statutes do not present simple black-letter rules that
aPPly uniformly, complying with them requires creative engagement
°n the part of corporate managers, employees, and agents; any effec
tive compliance program must work to cultivate this engagement and
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assure that individuals see themselves in a collaborative role with the
compliance office.
I.

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE

Corporations and other forms of enterprise organizations face a
challenge in assuring that their employees conform to legal require
ments, especially when those requirements are complicated.2 One
essential method for assuring lawful conduct by employees is to estab
lish a compliance program.3 Such programs come in a variety of forms
and are shaped by a variety of different theoretical approaches.'1 Un
derstanding the essential elements of compliance programs generally
is necessary for any understanding of how health care corporations can
most effectively avoid violating federal anti-kickback and anti-fraud
laws.5
Corporate compliance programs involve a system of policies and
controls that organizations implement as a means of preventing viola
tions of law.6 In addition, the mere existence of such programs can
stand as a demonstration of corporate good-faith, which may make it
easier for the corporation to distance itself from unlawful conduct by
its employees.7 Such programs often have different levels.8 At the
broadest and most general level, the programs aim to promote the
overall conduct of business in accordance with prescribed legal, and
increasingly ethical and cultural, norms.9 Compliance functions under
taken by corporations and other business entities include the
promulgation of behavioral codes, the institution of training programs,
the identification of internal compliance personnel, and the creation of
procedures and controls to ensure company-wide compliance with reg
ulatory requirements.10

2. Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compl
once with Law, 2002 COLIJM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 81-82 (discussing compliance programs ar
their principal elements).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6.
See generally id.
7. See generally Langevoort, supra note 2.
8 See generally Corporate Compliance Comm., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Corpora
Compliance Survey, 60 Bus. LAW. 1759 (2005)
9. Id.
R°S^in'General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findim
a
and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465 466-67 (2008).
'
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Compliance programs are typically administered by a chief
compliance officer who reports to executive management and is ulti
mately responsible for defining the elements of the program and for
assuring that it is carried out.11 Most commonly, compliance programs
include both policy-making and investigatory functions.12 In their pol
icy-making components, compliance programs write, revise, and
update corporation-wide codes of business conduct.13 These codes spe
cifically define what employees must do to conform to legal
requirements and what is unlawful.14 Corporate conduct codes also
serve an educational function, informing employees about the legal
limits on their conduct.15 With respect to their investigatory functions,
compliance programs and their administrators monitor and discipline
employees to prevent or sanction employees who may breach or have
breached either the corporation's own conduct policy or state or federal
laws.16
In the most general terms, the idea of corporate compliance has
both a positive and a negative aspect.17 In positive terms, a corporation
should comply with the law because its management, employees, and
other agents internalize the applicable legal rules, understanding and
accepting the purposes and objectives of those rules and integrating
that understanding into the corporate culture.18 In negative terms, cor
porate compliance means avoiding both civil and criminal liability.19
From this negative perspective, corporations are not trying to promote
or achieve the objectives behind the law; they are simply trying to
avoid liability.20 As this section will show, the greatest emphasis for
compliance programs has traditionally been on the negative aspects of
compliance, but there is an increasing movement toward positive ones,
especially with respect to the idea that the regulators and regulated
should collaborate on identifying shared goals arising from the applica-

11. See Rostain, supra note 10, at 482.
12. See generally id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 450 (2008).
17- See generally Lynn L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Cor
porations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of hnron s
Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2003) (discussing the formation of corporate culture).
lsId.
19. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 Geo. L.J. 1559, 159»
<1990).
20.

See infra Section II.A.
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ble regulatory scheme.21 Moreover, one useful way to understand the
difference between the positive and negative aspects of compliance is to
think of them as the difference between the internalization of the goals
behind the law and the avoidance of external constraints.22

A. Compliance as Conformity With External Constraints
One way to understand compliance is to see it as conformity
with a restraint imposed by an external actor.23 According to this con
ception, a corporation's compliance program is an instrument for
avoiding sanctions by external authorities who are engaged in an ad
versarial relationship with the corporation.24 This conception begins
with the premise that compliance is important because it diminishes
the risk that the corporation will be punished by regulatory agencies or
by the courts through civil or criminal litigation.25
1. "Constraint" as an External Cost
The idea of legal requirements as an external force is founded in
economic theory. According to economic theory, compliance with legal
rules involves an external cost, which is a theoretically unnecessary
burden on the business enterprise because it does not arise from the
essential aspects of the enterprise itself.25 When government creates a
legal rule for private actors, it is serving some public interest but im
posing the costs of such service on a private actor.27 Because an
external cost adds inefficiency, economic theory characterizes it as
something to be minimized or avoided, if possible.28
Under this conception of the economic effect of regulation, com
pliance with laws will always be contrary to the core interests of a
usiness enterprise, and the government agencies enforcing compli
ance will necessarily be in an adversarial relationship with the
enterprise.29 In an adversarial relationship that often culminates in
21.
22.

See infra Section II.B.
See infra Sections II.A, II.B.

Governir^ Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. Rkv. 949,
to the risk of the rrimi"8! ' e °Pment of corPorate compliance programs as a response
to the risk of the criminal prosecution of corporations).
24. Baer, supra note 23, at 961-62.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 961-62.

961-62 (^09Wde^hinChtKr

29.

See Baer, supra note 23, at 979.
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litigation, the parties anticipate allegations and factual and legal dis
putes between them; thus, a compliance program created in light of
this presupposition can wind up placing as much emphasis on prepar
ing for litigation as on preventing unlawful conduct by corporate
employees.30 Of course, avoiding liability for wrongdoing is a far differ
ent thing than promoting the utmost compliance with law, and it
involves a much lower standard of conduct.31 Consequently, when a
compliance program primarily aims to insulate the corporation from
liability, that corporation will aim for a much lower standard of legal—
not to mention ethical—behavior by its employees.32
2.

External Costs and Adversarial Relationships

The presupposition of an adversarial relationship between the
regulators and the regulated also affects the relationship between the
corporation and its employees.33 When a compliance program is prima
rily focused on preparing for adjudicative outcomes, the corporation in
general, and the compliance program in particular, can assume an ad
versarial posture of their own with respect to the corporation's
employees.34 When the corporation conceives of compliance by focusing
on protecting itself from the unlawful conduct of its employees, the cor
poration is effectively interposing itself between the outside regulator
and its employees.35 This is particularly true when the relevant regula
tions come from criminal law, and the anticipated adjudication is a
criminal prosecution against either the corporation itself or the em
ployee or both.36 If a compliance program is based on a contemplation
of this result, it may provide as many incentives to cover up illegal
behavior as to avoid it, and therefore it could be just as likely to pro
mote plausible deniability for the corporation as it is to encourage
employees to internalize and abide by legal requirements.37 In the end,
this kind of result could have the perverse effect of actually lowering
30. See Baer, supra note 23, at 979-80.
31. Id. at 961-62.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 984.
34. Baer, supra note 23, at 984; see also Robert J. Ridge & McKenzie A. Baird, The
Pendulum Swings Back: Revisiting Corporate Criminality and the Rise of Deferred Prosecu
tion Agreements, 33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 187, 196 (2008).
35. See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613,
1625-26 (2007).
36.
37.

Id.-, see also Baer, supra note 23, at 984.
Baer, supra note 23, at 986.
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the normative standards that, as a practical matter, govern employee
conduct.38
3. The Problem of an Adversarial Approach in a Complex
Organizational Environment
The potential disjunction between the corporation and its em
ployee's points out a problem with basing a compliance program on
adversarial presuppositions: Such a program does not accurately ac
count for organizational dynamics of the corporation.39 Not all
constituents of a corporation will have precisely the same interests and
motives with respect to compliance, but, the adversarial approach pre
supposes that they do.40 To be sure, the conception of the corporation
as a unitary entity is useful—and sometimes even necessary—in many
legal contexts.41 But, in the context of promoting compliance with the
law, it can make it harder to achieve a realistic understanding of how
to most effectively assure that employees follow the law.42
A corporation's organizational dynamics determine how its cor
porate culture is created and, therefore, how it disseminates
information and communicates norms among its employees. Some cor
porations may organize horizontally through overlapping and diffuse
networks; others may divide labor and information within a traditional
hierarchical structure.43 Regardless of what any corporation's particu
lar organizational structure might be, the structure controls the flow of
information through the company, and the varying nature of informa
tion flows presents varying opportunities for employees and managers
to respond to legal requirements, either by complying with them or vio
lating them.41 In addition, any corporation's structure has important
38. Baer, supra note 23, at 986; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of
I ubhc Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2076 (2005).
39. Baer, supra note 23, at 986.
40. Id.
41. See id.
?2, SeeK™neth Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking
and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 382 (2006).
U "r16 M326; Yane Svetiev- Antitrust Governance: The New Wave of
5f' 62°*21 (2007) discussing the effect of more innovative
management ^
for™ation of corporate culture); see also Stephen M. BainbridJ
°"
Ma
agen
ent
mthin a T>™ry of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 669-71
(IMUdZcriKnl?
'\
\
g C°nVentl0nal structures of internal firm organization that affect corporate
culture)
C
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L.
REV8N°I844-45 (2007M n n f ' T'l
mation from i cornnmt \
'i"8 J organizational structure may affect the flow of inforflowmanagement
and that such an information
en
0 wh,ch lower-level management and other employees com-
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consequences for determining what the corporate culture will be - or
even whether there will be multiple distinct corporate cultures across
different subdivisions of the entity.45 Thus, the factors that determine
compliance within one subdivision of the corporation may be entirely
different from those that determine compliance within another subdi
vision.46 In such a complex corporate culture, the task of defining and
administering a compliance program can be quite difficult.47
A regulatory and compliance process constructed around adver
sarial relationships only makes it more difficult, if not impossible, for
the law to recognize such complexity.48 Because the adversarial system
ascribes liability to the corporation itself, as a unitary whole, it cannot
recognize the reality of conflict or differences among different sub-units
of the corporation.49 Indeed, because the corporation's own internal
structure tends to be invisible to outsiders, it is difficult for any exter
nal regulators or adjudicators to even identify differences among subunits within the corporation.50
To be sure, however, adversarialism does have its uses.51 For
one thing, an adversarial relationship between the corporation and the
government agency imposing regulation can help prevent the problem
of regulatory capture - the circumstance in which the regulators defer
to the interests of the regulated entity rather than the public interest
associated with the regulation.52 As one commentator has pointed out:
Early in the agency's life cycle . . . [the agency's] actors maintain an
adverse posture, perhaps activated by an original regulatory vision.
Later on, personal career interests, interest group influence activi
ties and the cooperative dispositions that accompany personal
relationships can cause administrators' motivations to shift in a

ply with the law); see also Lawrence Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Information
Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1322-23
'2005) (discussing how organizational structure can affect information flows and determine
which managers or employees are in a position to violate the law and how they could violate
it).
45. Dallas, supra note 17, at 23 (noting that "[clorporate clime is not static, but is an
ongoing process. It may vary among sub-units of the corporation, although the corporation
may have a dominant type").
46. Baer, supra note 23, at 987.
47. Id.
48. ID.
49. ID.
50. See Buell, supra note 35, at 1625.
51. See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarhanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus
Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2003).
52. See id.
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more accommodating direction. The regulatory mission becomes
compromised as a result.53
Thus, without a certain level of adversarialism, regulators can lose the
discipline necessary for effective enforcement and for preserving the
inherent integrity of the regulatory system.54 In short, adversarialism
helps preserve a valuable degree of dynamic tension between the regu
lated corporation and the regulating agency, but if it is taken too far, it
can lead to a disregard of factors that are important in cultivating a
culture of compliance.
B. Compliance as the Realization of an Internalized Goal
Despite the dictates of economic theory, it is not essential to
view the regulatory process and compliance as being antithetical to the
objectives of a business enterprise.55 Businesses need not view enforce
ment authorities as adversaries, and it is not essential to treat
compliance costs as externalities that must be minimized.56 It is possi
ble to view compliance with the law as a positive value, the realization
of which should be a goal for the corporation." This means that compli
ance does not necessarily involve an adversarial relationship.58
Despite their prevalence in the Anglo-American legal tradition,
adversarial relationships are not the only instruments for advancing
legal objectives.59 Significant recent scholarship has suggested that
merican institutions rely too often on adjudication and related legal
strategies to accomplish social goals." This critique focuses on how untended externalities and transaction costs have undermined the
eXeai.ar dem0cratlc values that the legal system is supposed to
serve.61 As one commentator observed:
53. Bratton, supra note 51.
54. See id.
DEREGULATION DKBATE 86-87 FL992)!WAITK'

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.

RKSPONSIVE

REGULATION: TRANSCENDING

TI

86-87.

turalApproach, 101 CoLUM.Tkfv^SS 462(2001l- ?"lployJfe"t Discrimination: A Sir,
in Politically Distressing Tim**- rnn \r '
Susan D. Carle, Progressive Lawyeri
l"stltut'onal Self-Reform Achieve Mi
Effective Structural Change 30 HARV
J X n
Using Tort Litigation to Enforce ReguiafL ^~ 323'p325 (2007)' Ti™*hy D" L*t(
Makmg: Evaluating Climate Change L
igation in Light of Lessons from Cm lit
Gun'Indus^ and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 Ti
I- REV. 1837 1837 (2008)

T

61. Carle, supra note 60, at 325.
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Even at its best, litigation is expensive and time-consuming It is
surely a much better use of limited resources on all sides to devote
efforts to finding creative methods for moving forward, rather than
to be involved in endless gamesmanship and finger-pointing fo
cused on what has gone wrong in the past.62
One alternative approach to promoting regulation is associated
with the concept of "New Governance."63 This concept involves promot
ing more shared responsibility and power between regulators and
regulated entities.64 According to some scholars, such shared responsi
bility and power would permit different groups to collaborate with each
other, sometimes in shifting alliances, to negotiate solutions to com
plex problems as they arise.65 Other advocates of this shared
responsibility see it as a means of promoting experimentation in both
rule-making and enforcement, which could reduce the cost of verifica
tion and compliance.66 Regardless of the theoretical justifications for it,
the New Governance approach to regulation focuses on three aspects:
solving practical problems rather than vindicating abstract principles;
permitting more fluid regulatory structures; and making enforcement
a matter of persuasion more than punishment67
One of the defining elements of the New Governance approach
to regulation is the idea that it is better to solve problems through col
laboration with the persons and entities who are subject to regulation,
especially when such collaboration permits experimentation.68 As one
commentator explains:
Such an approach is necessary because problems have become too
complex for government to handle on its own, because disagree
ments exist about the proper ends of public action, and because
government increasingly lacks the authority to enforce its will on
62. Carle, supra note 60, at 325.
63. Baer, supra note 23, at 1000-15.
64. See, e.g., AYRES & BUAITHWAITE, supra note 55, at 86-87; Michael C. Dorf & Charles
• Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Jody
reeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 860
(2005); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Per
formance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001); Orly
L°bel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and
I e Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611 (2001); William H.
imon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liber
alism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2004); Jason Solomon, Book Note, Law and Governance
m the 2lst Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 819 (2008).
65. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64, at 267; Simon, supra note 64, at 127.
66. AYRES & BRAITIIWAITE, supra note 55, at 3-4.
67- Dorf & Sabel, supra note 64, at 267; Simon, supra note 64, at 127.
68Salamon, supra note 64, at 1623.
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other crucial actors without giving them a meaningful seat at the
table.69
Under a New Governance approach, the regulators and regu
lated entities are involved in a dialogue to reached shared objectives,
and the regulated entities are granted significant discretion to devise
processes necessary to achieve those goals.70 As William Simon has
contended, by focusing on problem-solving as the core objective of regu
lation, the New Governance approach emphasizes "common interests,
rather than the notion connoted by the idea of rights of individual in
terests competing with group interests."71 This kind of collaboration
and discretionary action promotes an atmosphere of trust, in which
both public and private actors can feel freer to fully disclose relevant
information and assure that the regulatory system is constantly adapt
ing to meet new realities in the regulated field.72
The collaborative process at the heart of New Governance re
gimes means that regulators and regulated entities will work together
to determine performance goals for the entity, as well as the procedu
ral mechanisms by which those performance goals will be
accomplished.7! This means that the regulators are in a better position
to assess the viability of the assumptions underlying regulatory objec
tives.74 Collaboration also gives regulators a tangible stake in assuring
that performance objectives and procedural mechanisms will work in
the real world occupied by the regulated entity.75
The collaborative approach to New Governance regulation also
involves a reduction in the severity of formal sanctions, especially for
firms that initially fail to reach prescribed standards.76 Lesser and ini
tial violations are met with efforts at persuasion and consultation by
e regu ators.77 If the corporation's violations are egregious and repet
itive, more punitive measures can be employed.78 In addition, some
proponents of New Governance have also called for the creation of new
torms of sanctions, including social control sanctions, such as "re-in69.

Salaraon, supra note 64, at 1623.

no teM, atTeiT™
71.
72.
74'
•
75.
76.
77.
78.

23'

10°2; Bamber«er.

note 42, at 377-78; Salomon, su,

Srmon, supra note 64, at 178; Baer, supra note 23, at 1004
Lobel, supra note 64, at 462; Baer, supra note 23, at 1002.

BUT
Baer-

mPra n°to M, at 106; Baer, supra note 23, at 1003.
™
supra note 23, at 1003.

LdJ7 t BliAI™W";E' m"ra note 65, at 106; Baer, supra note 23, at 1003.
Lobel, supra note 64, at 395; Baer, supra note 23, at 1004.
liJlPP
ffl/nrrt note
n n t n OO «i 1 r\r\rBaer,
supra
23, at 1005
Id.
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tegrative shaming."79 The objective of these new forms of sanctions is
to "indu[cel guilt and responsiveness in the wrongdoer" unlike punitive
sanctions, which are much more likely to "induce anger and resis
tance," which can be obstacles to on-going compliance.80
Given the rhetoric with which it is typically presented, it would
be easy to see the New Governance approach as a kind of Utopian
ideal.81 After all, who could be against collaboration, problem-solving,
and increased trust between government agencies and those that regu
late them? But such a dramatic departure from established approaches
to regulation cannot be expected to happen overnight, with the dissem
ination of some law review articles and some meetings between
corporate officers and the administrators of regulatory agencies.82 In
deed, there is a kind of chicken-and-egg problem with shifting to a New
Governance regime. Collaborative problem-solving and the granting of
discretion cannot work without a high level of trust between the regu
lators and the regulated; but trust cannot exist without a history of
collaboration.83
C. Combining the Positive and Negative Aspects of Compliance

All of this shows that, like any new theory, the New Governance
attempts to re-conceptualize an existing field; and, as with other new
and largely untested theories, it is not clear whether and to what ex
tent the New Governance approach will be workable. But there is
much to recommend the idea of focusing compliance programs on
showing managers, employees, and agents how to internalize the goals
of the law and make them their own.84 One reason to promote such
internalization is that it is consistent with a sophisticated idea of cor
porate personhood, one that recognizes the corporation as something
more than a profit-maximizing machine.85
It is, of course, commonplace to conceptualize the corporation as
3 purely economic actor that exists only to create profits for its share
holders and that responds only to the values of the marketplace.80
According to the finance theory taught in business schools, the idea of
79. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 55, at 92.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. Baer, supra note 23, at 1006-07.
83. Id.
84. See e.g., Larry D. Thompson, The Responsible Corporation: Its Historical Roots and
Continuing Promise, 29 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 199 (2015).
85Id. at 201-05.
86. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (40th ed. 2002).
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profit maximization "does not mean ... a primarily monetary interest,
a primary concern for economic growth, more income, fewer costs. It
means truly 'maximization,' a sole concern for profit."87 One of the
most notable proponents of this viewpoint is the Nobel Laureate Milton
Friedman, whom insisted that a corporation has "one and only one so
cial responsibility . . . - to . . . increase its profits . . . ."88 Indeed,
according to Professor Friedman, it would "undermine the very founda
tions of our free society" if corporations recognized and acted upon any
"social responsibility other than making maximum profits for stock
holders" as possible.89 He posited that any suggestion that a
corporation should respond to something other than the profit motive
is "a fundamentally subversive doctrine."90 If the corporation is viewed
through Professor Friedman's economistic lens, then corporate compli
ance with the law can only be understood as a constraint on corporate
action because compliance has no capacity to contribute to increasing
the bottom line on the corporate balance sheet.91 Under this view, com
pliance merely involves additional costs that diminish profits, and
corporations should comply with the law only to the extent necessary
to avoid costly legal sanctions 92
However, there are good reasons to reject this purely economic
viewpoint.98 Human beings have created Corporations to serve human
needs.94 As one commentator put it, "'[bjusiness' is not a set of valuefree machines. 'Business' is a set of living human organizations al
lowing us as individuals to live in a way we can stand to live - to have
lives as individuals we can justify to ourselves and each other."95
Human beings do more than merely calculate profits; they act in ser
vice of substantive values other than profit-making.90 Human beings
87. Thompson, supra note 84, at 202 (quoting Joseph Vining, The Effect of Economic
Integration with China on the Future of American Corporate Law 1, (Univ. of Mich. Law
Sch. Scholarship Repository: Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 11, 2010), https://
repository .law. u mich.ed u/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1122&context=law econ_cu rrent).
(emphasis in original).
88. FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 133.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Thompson, supra note 84, at 202.
92. See id. at 202-03.
93. See id at 201-05 (arguing against the purely economic conception of the corpora
tion promoted by Prof. Friedman).
94. Id. at 202, 202-03.
T nf> *
96.

Joseph

Viiiuig Competition, Corporate Responsibility and the China Question, 45
88 ,2°°3>1 h"P«o . aw.u
ty 1
mich.edu/cgiWeWconte„t,gi?ar

See id. at 88.
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do not refrain from taking actions that could harm others simply be
cause such actions would be costly; they refrain from actions with
harmful consequences because "[w]e actually don't want someone else
to be hurt, and if we really don't care, and really are indifferent to the
consequences of our actions, we are viewed as a bit of a psychiatric case
and a threat—certainly not someone who can be dealt with in ordinary
affairs."97 Given this unavoidable fact about human beings and the in
stitutions they create, it seems anomalous to conceive of the
corporation as being solely directed to profit-maximization.98
The case of Enron provides an object lesson in the dangers of an
exclusive concern with profit-maximization.99 Enron had a state-ofthe-art corporate code of conduct, reflecting a single-minded devotion
to profit maximization, that led to "the ascendance of unenlightened
self-interest—winning for yourself; I win, you lose. The Enron ... ra
tionalization was, 'We didn't do anything wrong, because we didn't
break the law.'"100 Eventually, of course, Enron did break the law in
manifold ways, and this result was the consequence of a corporate cul
ture that was devoted to profits at the exclusion of all other values.101
One reason that disaster resulted from Enron's single-minded
devotion to profit is that Enron overlooked the human dimension of the
corporation. Larry Thompson, former officer with Monsanto and
Providian Financial Corporation, and a former United States Deputy
Attorney General, explained the problem with the view of the corpora
tion as an entity entirely devoted to profit:
The shortcoming of this view is that the corporation is not solely an
economic phenomenon - it is a legal phenomenon as well. A busi
ness corporation does not rise spontaneously from the intersection
of contracts among private parties in the marketplace. A corpora
tion is a legal fiction - an artificial person "existing only in
intendment and consideration of law," and we create these artificial
persons in our own image. We are social and moral actors with re
sponsibilities to our community - why should we assume that our
corporations are not? They have whatever characteristics we endow
them with and whatever responsibilities we choose to impose on
them. A corporation has perpetual life; it governs itself through by
laws of its own choosing, it can buy and sell property and can sue
and be sued in its own name - and, in law, its liability is limited to
the assets that it holds in its own name. A corporation possesses
97. Vining, supra note 95, at 83.
98. See id. at 88; see also Thompson, supra note 84, at 202-03.
99. Vining, supra note 95, at 85.
100. Lenny T. Mendonca & Matt Miller, Interview with Daniel Yankelovich, Public
Opinion Analyst & Social Scientist, in La Jolla, Col., 2 MCKINSEY Q. 64, 2007, 69.
101. Thompson, supra note 84, at 202-03.
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these attributes only because the state has willed that it be so. It is
therefore more than a little strange to suppose that a body corpo
rate owes nothing to the body politic that created it as an act of
legislative grace.102
As Thompson points out, the corporation should consider noneconomic objectives for another reason; because it has been created by
law and must respond to the underlying principles that animate the
law, as well as the explicit legal rules that prescribe certain aspects of
corporate conduct.103 In other words, the corporation cannot operate
entirely according to economic principles because it is not the product
of solely economic forces.104 According to economic theory, considera
tions relevant to social interests are considered to be "externalities,"
which should not be factored into the corporation's assessment of costs
and benefits.105 However, the law, not economic theory creates the cor
poration, and it is the law, not economic theory, that decides what is
external and what is internal to the corporation.106
Scholars are not the only ones who reject absolute allegiance to
Friedman's idea that the corporation can properly be devotpd to profitmaking alone.107 In its Principles of Corporate Governance, the Ameri
can Law Institute ("ALI") has provided that, in the conduct of its
business, a corporation has no legal obligation to pursue profit alone
and "[m|ay devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare,
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes."108 Indeed,
the ALI recognizes that such pursuit of non-economic objectives is ap
propriate "[e]ven if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not
thereby enhanced."109 Similarly, the Business Roundtable eschews a
purely economic conception of the corporation and recognizes that cor
porations have a duty to serve social needs, along with the interests of
their shareholders in profit-making.110
Given that many corporations operate internationally, Ameri
can authorities are not the only relevant ones in determining
102. Thompson, supra note 84, at 202-03 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA
RIES *464).

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 203-05.
Id. at 203-05; see also Vining, supra note 95, at 84.
Vining, supra note 95, at 84.
Thompson, supra note 84, at 203-05.
See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

107.
§ 2.01(B) (AM. LAW INST. 1994).

108.
109.

Id.
Id.

110. Statement of the Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American Com
petitiveness, 46 Bus. LAW. 241, 244 (1990).
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fundamental principles of corporate governance, especially the objec
tives that the corporation should serve. For example, in Japan, a court
held that the chemical company was liable for the birth defects caused
by the company's discharge into a bay of waste water which contained
mercury.111 The company's discharge did not violate any environmen
tal law; it was in compliance with every statutory and regulatory
standard.112 Indeed, the company's methods for treating its waste
water were state of the art and were superior to the methods pursued
by similarly situated companies.113 The company was liable because it
had acted in a manner that was contrary to a social interest.114 China
mandates similar corporate attention to social interests.115 To be sure,
China's concern with socially conscious corporate behavior could be
seen as a product of its Communist heritage; its former corporation law
made business firms responsible for "strengthening socialist spiritual
civilization."116 However, even after China embraced market capital
ism, it still expressly requires that a corporation "respect" and act in
furtherance of "social responsibility."117 Consequently, international
corporations have an even greater reason to establish governance prin
ciples that account for something more than profit.118
A corporation cannot effectively internalize social goals if it
views compliance strictly as a matter of acting within a constraint im
posed by law.119 The kinds of objectives that are not comprehended by
economic theory are more easily achieved when viewed as internal to
the corporation and not simply as externalities that restrict profitabil
ity.120 Because a goal is defined from within the corporation (unlike a
constraint, which is defined by something outside the corporation), it
can be more effective to view compliance as a goal rather than a
constraint.121
Moreover, viewing adherence to the law as the achievement of a
goal rather than as accession to a constraint can make for more effec-

111.
112.
113.

See Vining, supra note 95, at 85-86.
Id.
Id.

114. See id.
H5. Vining, supra note 95, at 6 (comparing the 1993 and 1999 Companies Law of the
People's Republic of China).
U6. Id.
H7. Id.
H8. Id.
119-

See id. at 84.

120121.

Vining, supra note 95, at 84.
Id.
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tive compliance.122 This is particularly true when the regulatory
scheme is open-ended and applies to discretionary decision-making by
corporate actors.123 When a regulation does not create a black-letter
rule but, instead, demands the thoughtful application of abstract prin
ciples, compliance training will be much more effective when it
facilitates the internalization of those principles by corporate actors.124
The following section will show how the federal regulatory scheme
prohibiting false claims and kickbacks in the provision health care ser
vices creates just the abstract and flexible system that resonates with
the insights behind New Governance ideas of compliance.
II.

THE FEDERAL REGIME FOR PREVENTING FRAUD AND KICKBACKS
IN HEALTH CARE SERVICES

The provision of health care services entails a risk that deci
sions about treatment will be made by what is profitable rather than
what is medically necessary.125 This is especially true when physicians
are considering whether to refer a patient to another health care pro
vider.12<> In this situation, it is important that the medical
professionals place the patient's interest ahead of any considerations
about their mutual business advantage.127
To reduce the possibilities of such self-interested decision-making, the federal government has imposed a broadly framed statutory
prohibition against the payment of kickbacks in connection with the
provision of any medical service associated with a federal health care
program.128 According to the Department of Justice's Office of Inspec
tor General ( OIG"), the purpose of this prohibition "is to protect
patients and the federal health care programs from fraud and abuse by
curtailing the corrupting influence of money on health care deci
sions. 129 Given the breadth of this prohibition, Congress authorized
the OIG to promulgate regulations defining certain "safe harbors"—
categories of conduct that will not implicate the Anti-Kickback stat??•
US.
124.

Y1"'"?'' SUpm n°te 95, at 84; see also Thompson, supra note 84, at 201-05.
See Vining, supra note 95, at 84; see also Thompson, supra note 84, at 201-05.
Vining, supra note 95, at 84.

126.
127.

Id.
Id.

128.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012).

129.

AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 55, at 86-87.
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ute's prohibitions. |;,° These regulatory safe harbors are essential in
understanding how the Anti-Kickback statute applies to medical
practice.131
Federal law provides additional protection against the abuses of
medical decision-making through the False Claims Act ("FCA"), which
prohibits the making of false statements in connection with any claim
for payment from the federal government—for example, through a
claim for reimbursement through a federal health insurance pro
gram.132 Because much of the conduct that could violate the AntiKickback statute also involves false statements about what is medi
cally necessary, there is substantial overlap between Anti-Kickback
statute and the FCA with respect to health care providers.133 Conse
quently, compliance efforts must look to both statutes when
establishing the boundaries of acceptable conduct.
A.

Anti-Kickback Statute

One of the key aspects of this federal regulatory regime is the
prohibition against kickbacks between health care providers. The fed
eral Anti-Kickback statute imposes criminal penalties on any person
that "knowingly and willfully solicits, receives, offers, or pays any re
muneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind," to any person:
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the fur
nishing or arranging for the furnishing of an item or service for
which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal
health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or
recommending the purchasing, leasing, or ordering of any good, fa
cility, service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or
in part under a Federal health care program.134
The prohibition on kickbacks is quite broad.135 It applies to es
sentially every proposed financial interaction, whether or not actually
implemented, among health care providers and pharmaceutical compa
nies.1 •i<> In the first years after its enactment, the statute was often
130.
!31.
132.
133.
134.
135.
!36.

AYRES & BUAITHWAITE, supra note 55, at 86-87.
See 42 C.F.R. Part 1001 (2017).
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (2009).
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2015), with 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(l).
See id.
See Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 65372 (Dec. 19, 1994).
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interpreted to apply primarily to relationships between institutional
providers or suppliers and practitioners in a position to generate refer
rals for the providers or suppliers.137 However, in 1994, the OIG issued
a fraud alert that made it clear that the statute applied to pharmaceu
tical marketing activities, including:
Any prize, gift or cash payment, coupon or bonus (e.g., airline dis
counts and related travel premiums), offered to physicians and/or
suppliers (including pharmacies, mail order prescription drug com
panies and managed care organizations) in exchange for, or based
on, prescribing or providing specific prescription products. These
items are particularly suspect if based on value or volume of busi
ness generated for the drug company.
Materials which offer cash or other benefits to pharmacists (or
others in a position to recommend prescription drug products) in
exchange for performing marketing tasks in the course of pharmacy
practice related to Medicare or Medicaid. The marketing tasks may
include sales-oriented educational or counseling contacts, or physi
cian and/or patient outreach, etc.
Grants to physicians and clinicians for studies of prescription prod
ucts when the studies are of questionable scientific value and
require little or no actual scientific pursuit. The grants may none
theless offer substantial benefits based on, or related to, use of the
product.
Any payment, including cash or other benefit, given to a patient,
provider or supplier for changing a prescription, or recommending
or requesting such a change, from one product to another, unless
the payment is made fully consistent with a safe harbor
regulation.138
There is some uncertainty about the mens rea requirement for
the Anti-Kickback Statute; the statutory text does not define the terms
nowing and willfully," and the Federal Courts of Appeals are split on
the definition.139 Some courts have held that the violator must have
had the specific intent to violate the anti-kickback statute itself.140
1-57.
138.

Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg 65372
Id. at 65376.
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Others have set a slightly lower bar for finding mens rea, holding that
a defendant can be liable under the statute as long as the defendant
knows its conduct is wrongful, even if it does not know the specific law
that makes it wrongful.141 Despite this division of opinion of just how
specific an accused's intent must be, there is no doubt that the statute
requires a specific intent to engage in wrongdoing as a basis for
liability.142
The statute does carve out certain areas of activity that are ex
empt from the broad statutory prohibition.143 These "safe harbors" are
set forth in both the statutory text itself, and in regulations established
by the OIG.144 The safe harbors describe activities that the govern
ment will not prosecute because the government has determined that
these activities are unlikely to be abusive.145 The safe harbors are
more likely to apply to price concessions provided in connection with
the purchase of drugs or the purchase of expert consulting services,
than to promotional or other activities that provide "one-sided" value to
customers and consumers.146
In addition to the formally defined exceptions and safe harbors,
there are other ways that particular instances of conduct can escape
the anti-kickback statute's broad prohibition.147 An arrangement
among health care providers and/or pharmaceutical companies that
would, on its face, violate the statute may be deemed lawful by the OIG
if it does not involve improper intent or does not adversely affect the
quality of patient care.148 The OIG has described certain "aggravating
considerations" that identify those arrangements that may pose the
greatest risk of prosecution.149 Those considerations include:
Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to interfere with,
or skew, clinical decision-making? Does it have a potential to under
mine the clinical integrity of a formulary process? If the
arrangement or practice involves providing information to decision
makers, prescribers, or patients, is the information complete, accu
rate, and not misleading?
141.
142.
143.
144.

See, e.g., Starks, 157 F.3d at 838; Jain, 93 F.3d at 440-41.
See, e.g., Starks, 157 F.3d at 838; Jain, 93 F.3d at 440-41.
See Fact Sheet, supra note 125.
Id.

145. Fact Sheet, supra note 125.
146. Id.
147. See OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68
Reg. 23731, 23736 (May 5, 2003).
148. Id.
149. See id.
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Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to increase costs
to the federal health care programs, beneficiaries, or enrollees?
Does the arrangement or practice have the potential to be a dis
guised discount to circumvent the Medicaid Rebate Program Best
Price calculation?
Does the arrangement or practice have a potential to increase the
risk of overutilization or inappropriate utilization?
Does the arrangement or practice raise patient safety or quality of
care concerns?150
A recent Seventh Circuit case illustrates the challenges in as
suring compliance with the requirements of the anti-kickback
statute.151 Because the statute raises delicate factual questions about
the intent of participants in a transaction and the effect of that trans
action on their medical decisions, health care providers must take care
not only in framing the details of any particular transaction itself, they
must also look to circumstances surrounding that transaction.152 Com
pliance with the Anti-Kickback statute can be assured only by being
sensitive to their actions and the attendant contexts for those
actions.153
In United States v. Patel, the defendant was an internist who
treated many elderly patients who needed home care services and paid
for those services with Medicare benefits.15'1 When Dr. Patel deter
mined that one of his patients needed home care services, his staff
provided the patient with brochures from numerous companies that
provided such services and permitted the patient to make an indepen
dent choice among them.155 One provider, Grand Home Health Care,
ottered to pay Dr. Patel for referrals.156 According to Dr. Patel's trial
estimony, he never affirmatively accepted this offer and continued to
o ow his existing method of informing his patients about many home
ea care providers and allowing them to make independent
oiccs.
s it happened, somewhere between two and four patients
selected Grand each month.™ When a patient selected Grand, Grand
Create a treatment plan for the patient and fill out a Medicare
Reg. 23731, 23734^ May^ ^OO.^"1
I52;
153.
154.
155.
156.

See id.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 610.
Id. at 609.

157.
158.

Patel, 778 F.3d at 609
Id. at 610.
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certification form 485 for Dr. Patel's signature, which is required for
Medicare reimbursement.159 Whenever Dr. Patel signed the certifica
tion form, Grand would give him $400, and it paid a further $300 for
his signature on a recertification form, which was required after the
first sixty days of treatment.160 The payments were made in cash, with
no written contract or other formal payment record.161 There was no
dispute that the patients needed the services; nor did the government
allege that Dr. Patel directed their decision-making about which pro
vider to choose.162 And only a small minority of his patients used
Grand.163
When the government began investigating Grand's business
practices, Grand agreed to cooperate, and evidence was collected about
the payments to Dr. Patel, among others.164 Dr. Patel was charged
with criminal violations of the Anti-Kickback statute, which entailed
both substantial fines and imprisonment.165 As a defense, Dr. Patel ar
gued that he had not actually referred any of his patients to Grand
because they had made their own independent decisions about their
home health care providers.166 He contended that "refer" means that
the physician personally recommends that a patient seek care from a
particular provider, and conversely that there is no "referral" when a
patient independently chooses a provider.167
The Seventh Circuit rejected this interpretation of the stat
ute.168 It concluded that a physician provides a referral anytime that it
acts as a gatekeeper for the patient's receipt of services.169 In reaching
this conclusion, the court invoked the statute's principal purpose,
which is to prevent decision-making that leads to increased cost of care
and contravention of patient free choice.170
Dr. Patel insisted that this kind of definition of "referral" would
criminalize a wide range of innocent activities.171 For example, if a hos
pital paid a physician to give a speech, Dr. Patel argued that this broad
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Patel, 778 F.3d
Patel, 778 F.3d
Id. at 611.
See id. at 610.
Id.
Patel, 778 F.3d
Id.
Id.
Id. at 612-13.
Patel, 778 F.3d
Id. at 613-14.
Id. at 615.
Id. at 616.
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definition could mean that such a physician could be liable if some of
his patients are later treated by the hospital that paid for his
speech.172 The Court disagreed, noting two important points.173 First
a payment must be "in return" for a referral to trigger the application
of the statute; payments made solely as compensation for legitimate
services (such as giving a speech) are not illegal.174 Second, to be a
"referral," the physician must do something that either directs a pa
tient to a particular provider or allows the patient to receive care from
that provider.175 "And even if the doctor in Patel's hypothetical had
steered his patients to the hospital, the doctor could not be prosecuted
because he was not paid 'in return for' referrals."176
The Patel case shows that both physicians and other health care
providers must be sensitive to all aspects of their business relationship
in order to avoid a risk of liability under the Anti-Kickback statute.177
The government views patient referrals in a broad context, and every
one with any connection to a patient referral must be aware of all
aspects of that context to assure that no-one takes any actions that
could be construed as violations.173 This means that any person con
nected in any way to a health care referral must have a comprehensive
understanding of the general principles of the statute and must be al
ways prepared to apply that understanding.179
B. False Claim and Fraud Laws
law also Pr°hibits health care providers from submit
tint*
connection with claims for governmen
navment
Eon m
7 7 are or Medicaid reimbursement.'»<> This pre
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("FCA").182 A person may be subject to penalties under the FCA for
knowingly submitting a false claim for payment to the federal govern
ment (or for causing another person to submit such a false claim).183
Like the Anti-Kickback statute, the FCA requires a high level of
mens rea for liability.184 For the purposes of the statute, "knowing" or
"knowingly" means that a person: (1) "has actual knowledge of the in
formation on which the claim for payment is made"; and (2) "acts in
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information"; or, "acts
in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information."185 Un
like the Anti-Kickback statute, however, the FCA does not require a
specific intent to defraud or act wrongfully.186
FCA claims may be brought by the government or by private
parties, who act as whistleblowers in a qui tarn action.187 In general, a
qui tam action is one in which the whistleblower, known in technical
terms as a "relator," makes a claim on behalf of the government.188 The
enforcement of the FCA through qui tam actions has increased in fre
quency in recent years.189
The remedies available to FCA plaintiffs, including relators,
can be extensive. For one thing, the FCA provides for mandatory treble
damages.19" After the judge or jury determines actual damages at trial,
the court must apply mandatory treble damages.191 In addition, the
FCA provides for mandatory civil penalties of $5,500 to $10,000 for
each and every individual claim that is identified at trial.192 In qui tam
actions, the relator may be awarded as much as thirty percent of the
recovery on claims where the government does not intervene and up to
182. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West 2009); 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730 (West, 2010) 31 U.S.C.A
3731(West, 2009).
183. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a).
184. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b).
185. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(1)(A).
186. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(1)(B) (providing the knowledge requirement in the FCA "require(s) no proof of specific intent to defraud").
31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(1) ("A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section
29 for the person and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in
(1 name of the Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorn?Y General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting."); see
also 31 U S.C.A. § 3730(c).
18831 U.S.C.A. § 3730(c).
189. See generally Amandeep S. Sidhu, The Growing Threat of Qui Tam Litigation
p"nst ^alth Care Providers, 12 A.B.A SEC. LITIG. 1 (2014), http://www.mwe.com/files/
Cation/9594f763-6360-4b78-af86-04b9dc36c045/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
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twenty-five percent of the recovery on claims where intervention doe
occur.193 Finally, the losing defendant may have to pay the relator'
attorneys' fees and other litigation costs.194
Amendments to the FCA were effected as a part of the enact
ment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act195 ("ACA") ii
2010. These amendments established four significant changes to th
FCA that favored relators and increased the extent of potential liabil
ity for health care providers.196
First, the amendments limited the availability of an often-usei
defense in qui tarn cases under the FCA.197 Before the ACA, court
were required to dismiss an action when the factual basis for the rela
tor's claims had been publicly disclosed.198 But, the ACA amendment
limited the circumstances under which public disclosure would lead t
dismissal, and it provided that, even when public disclosure occurrec
the government could preserve jurisdiction over the case by objectin
to the motion to dismiss.199 Second, the ACA revised the requiremen
to provide relators with a lower threshold of knowledge necessary t
overcome the limitation on actions affected by public disclosure.20
While the prior statutory language required relators to have "direc
and independent knowledge of the information on which the allega
tions are based," the amendments modified the requirement so tha
they need only have "knowledge that is independent of and material!
adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions."201 Third, a
a supplement to earlier amendments that had been part of the 200
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, the ACA added a sixty-day re
tention rule for overpayments that could give rise to FCA liability.20
Aftei the ACA amendments, providers were required to report and re
turn any overpayments within sixty days of discovery or be subjecte1
to potential FCA liability.203 Fourth, the ACA resolved a circuit spli
193. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d).
194. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(4).
10^20^tdifi^utc^16 Care ACt'
196. Id.
197. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (West 2005).
iys. id.
199.
200.
201.

PUb' L' N°- m"148' 124 Stat'

31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B)

Id.

AC' °f 2°°9' Pub' L' U1"21- 123 Stat
312U2S.CS§§S« USc"Tim
Patien' Pr0teCti°n & ***"
Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148; effective Mar. 23, M10) ^
203. Id.

REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

2017

273

regarding whether claims submitted as a result nf ™ i .•
vlolations of the
anti-kickback statute constitute false claims fnr
204
ity.
With the ACA amendment, p™
aut°matic
statutory liability under the anti-kickback statute —
Because the FCA can have snmriein^i,, ^ is essential that all employees and agents of hea
be
S^pTe
by the
United States ex rel. Escobar.™ There a _ w
7™ C°'
family was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and received^ ores 3 t""
tr
Medicaid p,M foc he,
O
of several months she suffered repeated seizures from the medication
eventually dying from complications due to the seizures.- y^her
parents became concerned that the treatment was not effective they
complained to state regulators, who discovered that the treatment
providers were both unqualified and unsupervised.2- When the Com
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workforce, and because the underlying regulatory violations were sub
stantial, the Court suggested that the plaintiff-relator had met its legal
burden.214 In particular, the Court pointed to the statute's reference to
reckless disregard of the truth as a basis for liability, thereby imposing
a substantial burden on any person or company who submits claims for
payment from government health insurance programs.215
This holding means that health care providers cannot avoid
FCA liability by disregarding the factual circumstances underlying
treatment.216 They will be required to take an active role in assuring
the propriety of any services paid for by the government.217 Thus, their
employees and agents will have to be vigilant about taking an active
role in understanding all aspects of the treatment process.218
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE AND THE FCA
TO SPECIFIC TYPES OF TRANSACTIONS IN THE PROVISION
OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES

Given the breadth of the prohibitions imposed by the Anti-Kick
back statute and the FCA, there are a wide variety of situations that
can implicate either or both of these statutes in the provision of health
care services. In order to understand the principles that should inform
the development of an effective compliance program, it is necessary to
understand some of the most prominently discussed situations and
how they can be handled without violating either the Anti-Kickback
statute or the FCA. The following section describes some of those
situations.

A. Drug and Device Sales
The rules prohibiting kickbacks create a special challenge for
the sales of any drug or medical device because they create a risk that
any discount offered on a sale could be characterized as a remunera
tion paid in return for the purchase of the product.219 In addition,
because of the intersection between the FCA and the Anti-Kickback
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Universal Health Serv's, 136 S. Ct. at 1999-2002
Id. at 2001.
Id. at 2002.
See id. at 2001-02.
See id.
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statute, improperly offering or providing a discount that is character
ized as a kickback could lead to FCA liability as well.220 Thus, the need
for effective compliance precautions is particularly important when
ever any seller of health care products or services contemplates
offering some kind of discount.
Because discounts can be a perfectly legitimate instrument of
fair competition in the marketplace, the regulatory scheme surround
ing the Anti-Kickback statute creates a safe harbor exception for
discounts.221 This safe harbor protects discounts on items and services
reimbursed under a federal health care program.222 For the purposes
of the statutory scheme, "discount" is defined as a reduction in the
amount a buyer is charged for an item or service based on an armslength transaction.223 "Discount" includes rebates and other discounts
not given at the time of sale.224 The definition excludes all of the follow
ing: (1) cash payments or equivalents; (2) supplying one good or service
without charge or at a reduced charge to induce the purchase of a dif
ferent good or service unless both are reimbursed by federal health
care programs pursuant to the same methodology (i.e., the same global
payment); (3) a reduction in price applicable to one payer but not to
federal health care programs; (4) a routine reduction or waiver of any
coinsurance or deductible amount: (5) warranties; (6) services provided
in accordance with a personal or management services contract; or (7)
other remuneration not explicitly defined as a discount.225
In its official guidance regarding how to comply with the stat
utes and regulations prohibiting kickbacks, the OIG emphasized that:
any remuneration from a manufacturer provided to a purchaser
that is expressly or impliedly related to a sale potentially implicates
the anti-kickback statute and should be carefully reviewed ....
Examples of remuneration in connection with a sale include, but
are not limited to, "prebates" and "upfront payments," other free or
reduced-price goods or services, and payments to cover the costs of
"converting" from a competitor's product.226
Given that the line between permissible discounts and impermissible
kickbacks can be so difficult to draw, it is essential to identify particu-

220.
221.
222.
223224225-

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(l).
42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(h) (2017).
See § 1001.952(h).
§ 1001.952(h)(5).
§ 1001.952(h)(4).
§ 1001.952(hM5).
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iar factors that will be important in the distinction that the regulatory
authorities will make.2'27
According to guidance from the OIG, the crucial factor in distin
guishing between legitimate and illegitimate discounts is whether the
price reduction effected by the discount was a part of the sales transac
tion.228 In its guidance, the OIG has emphasized that the discount
must be in the form of a reduction in price given at the time of sale or
set at the time of sale.229 When a benefit of some kind is defined and
provided after the sales transaction, it is impermissible to characterize
such a benefit as a "discount" on an earlier transaction.230
Apart from the time at which the discount is defined and prom
ised, there are other factors that can help identify discounts that
qualify for the safe harbor.231 Many of these factors are specific to cer
tain kinds of transactions. For example, discounts must be disclosed on
invoices or similar documentation.232 In addition, the buyer must be
put on notice of its obligation to report the discount; and nothing must
be done to impede that buyer from fulfilling its obligations.233 Because
full disclosure of pricing arrangements is essential for fostering full
and fair competition, pharmaceutical manufacturers must also track
and report discounts accurately under various government pricing pro
grams, many of which require that the price reported include all
applicable discounts.234

227. See OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers,
Fed. Reg. at 23735-36.
228.
Reg. at
229.
230.
231.
232.
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Certain kinds of methods for offering price reductions and in
ducing business create particular problems for the discountTkickback
distinction.235 For example, in some situations, sellers try to win new
customers and encourage an initially high volume of business by pro
viding "upfront payments" and/or "signing bonuses."236 Such payments
generally apply to first-year purchases, and they are defined when the
seller establishes a net price for each purchase during the first year,
which varies with the number of purchases.237 The OIG generally
views such payments as suspect, and they are difficult to conform to
the "discount safe harbor" unless the payments are applied to specific
purchases.238
Similarly, when a seller offers a credit memo as a substitute for
a cash discount, it may run afoul of the reporting requirements be
cause the credits may be earned based on the purchase of certain
products, but, are applied to reduce the purchase price of other prod
ucts.239 When a transaction involves a discount framed as a credit
memo, any agreement between the buyer and seller should clearly
identify the credit as a discount, and the agreement should clearly set
forth the allocation of the discount, so there will be no doubt that the
discount was framed and applied at the time of the transaction.240
Another circumstance that can lead to problems under the AntiKickback statute and/or the FCA arises when a manufacturer offers
free supplies and equipment that are incidental but necessary to the
use of the product that the manufacturer makes and sells.241 In many
cases, these incidental supplies and equipment have no independent
value because they are connected with the use of the manufacturer's
product.24'2 Whether the provision of these incidental items at no cost
constitutes a discount depends upon the nature of such items, and both
manufacturers and sellers can be in a quandary about how to allocate
the value of such free equipment to other purchases.243 Along similar
235. See D. McCarty Thornton, OIG Letter on Upfront Rebates, Prebates, and Signing
Bonuses, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. (July 17, 2000), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/safeharborregu lations/preba te.htm.
236. ID.
237. SEE ID.
238. SEE ID.
239. ID.
240. ID.
241. See e.g., Kevin G. McAnaney, OIG Letter on Free Computers, Facsimile Machines,
and Other Goods, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. /July 3, 1997), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/safe
ar 0rregulations/freecomputers.htm.
242.
See id.
243. See id.
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lines, manufacturers may offer free product support or reimbursement
assistance to physicians or other providers by providing information
regarding insurance coverage criteria and reimbursement levels foi
their products.24"1 These services have no independent value to provid
ers apart from the products themselves.245 In these cases, the
incidental support services may be considered part of the products pur
chased, and their cost may be considered bundled into the products
prices.246 But, other reimbursement support programs may look more
like impermissible kickbacks because they represent an independent
financial benefit to physicians or other providers.247 These reimburse
ment services might include requiring payment for products by
purchasers only if the product is reimbursed by third party payors.24*
According to the OIG, these services eliminate the normal financial
risks for providers and create overutilization and increased costs.249

Another potential problem associated with the sale of medical
devices involves demonstrations and training provided by the manu
facturer.2'0 Unlike drugs, a complicated medical device may require a
demonstration to evaluate the device or training to ensure its appropri
ate use.251 Most commonly, the manufacturer itself will provide such
demonstrations or training, and, in many cases, the manufacturer will
offer them at a central location, such as the manufacturer's own facility
or at the site of a professional meeting, but not at the facility of each
and every health care provider that might be interested in the de
vice.252 When a manufacturer hosts these activities, the manufacture!
may reimburse physicians or other provider representatives for the
reasonable costs of travel and lodging related to attendance at training
sessions.2'3 But, in this context, both buyers and sellers have to be
careful to avoid covering excessive travel or lodging costs (which coulc

R.l449,7?!G,^anCec',ogram Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed
Keg. 28731, 23735 (May 5, 2003).
245. See id.
246. See id.
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make the demonstration seem like an excuse for a vacation for the
buyer's representatives).254

B. Sales of Services
Of course, the flow of transactions between health care provid
ers and drug and device makers flows in both directions.
Manufacturers may purchase a wide range of services from the institu
tions that provide health care, as well as the doctors and other
professionals associated with the provider. Doctors and professionals
can provide these services by acting as advisory board members,
speakers, preceptors, or researchers.255 Anytime a manufacturer
purchases services from a person who is a customer or is associated
with a customer, one can question whether the manufacturer's
purchase is merely a cover for an unlawful kickback. And, if the pur
chased service implicates a claim for a payment from the federal
government in one way or another, there could be questions about FCA
liability as well. Both manufacturers and health care providers must
be careful to assure that all arrangements for services to manufactur
ers are commercially reasonable and should avoid any suggestion of
excessive or improper payments to the professionals providing the
services.
As with other kinds of transactions between manufacturers and
health care providers, the provision of professional services to manu
facturers must come within one of the defined safe harbors.256 The safe
harbor for personal services and management contracts protects cer
tain arrangements.257 To qualify for safe harbor protection, personal
service, and management contracts between health care providers and
manufacturers must meet certain conditions:
• there must be a formal, written agreement that is signed by both
parties;
• the agreement must cover all of the services to be provided for
the term of the agreement;
• the agreement must be for at least one year;
• if the agreement provides for the services on a periodic, sporadic
or part-time basis, the agreement must specify exactly the sched254. See ADVANCED MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, supra note 250 at 16.
"if u
Purc^ase of research services from provider institutions and their employees
will be discussed more fully in infra Section III.C in connection with the sponsorship of
clinical trials. See infra Section III.C.
56. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed.
feg- 23731, 23736 (May 6, 2003).

257. Id.
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ule of such intervals, their precise length, and the exact charge
for such intervals;
• the aggregate compensation paid to the agent over the term of
the agreement must be set in advance and be consistent with fair
market value in arms-length transactions, and must not be de
termined in a manner that takes into account the volume or
value of any referrals or business otherwise generated between
the parties for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under Medicare or a state health program;
• the services performed under the agreement must not involve the
counseling or promotion of a business arrangement or other ac
tivity that violates any state or federal law; and
• the aggregate services contracted for must not exceed those
which are reasonably necessary to accomplish the commercially
reasonable business purpose of the services.258

Some of these conditions can be difficult to accomplish. For ex
ample, the realities and uncertainties of an evolving business
arrangement can make it difficult, and perhaps impossible, for the
manufacturer and the health care provider to anticipate exactly how
and when all of the services will be provided. Consequently, it is often
difficult to meet the requirement that aggregate compensation be set
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eluding, for example, ghost-written papers or speeches—implicates
the anti-kickback statute. While full disclosure by physicians of any
potential conflicts of interest and of industry sponsorship or affilia
tion may reduce the risk of abuse, disclosure does not eliminate the
risk
Recently, some entities have been compensating physi
cians for time spent listening to sales representatives market
pharmaceutical products. In some cases, these payments are char
acterized as "consulting" fees and may require physicians to
complete minimal paperwork. Other companies pay physicians for
time spent accessing web sites to view or listen to marketing infor
mation or perform "research." All of these activities are highly
suspect under the anti-kickback statute, are highly susceptible to
fraud and abuse, and should be strongly discouraged.261

C. Clinical Trial Sponsorship
The makers of drugs and medical devices also engage the pro
fessionals employed by their customers when it comes to conducting
research for their products. The research may be designed to generate
the clinical data required for FDA approval of a new product or new
indication for an existing product, or the research may be necessary to
generate clinical data used as a basis for marketing programs for a
product that has already been approved by the FDA. Clinical trial
sponsorship will raise concerns under the Anti-Kickback statute to the
extent that the clinical trial has no meaningful value to the manufac
turer or that the compensation paid to the principal investigator/
health care provider for conducting the trial exceeds the fair market
value of the services provided.262
The OIG has set forth some basic principles governing the spon
sorship of clinical trials. It has pointed out that:
Manufacturers often contract with purchasers of their products to
conduct research activities on behalf of the manufacturer on a feefor-service basis. These contracts should be structured to fit in the
personal services safe harbor whenever possible. Payments for re
search services should be fair market value for legitimate,
reasonable, and necessary services. Post-marketing research activi
ties should be especially scrutinized to ensure that they are
legitimate and not simply a pretext to generate prescriptions of a
drug. Prudent manufacturers will develop contracting procedures
that clearly separate the awarding of research contracts from mar
keting. Research contracts that originate through the sales or

R^1'
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marketing functions—or that are offered to purchasers in connec
tion with sales contacts—are particularly suspect.263

Clinical trial sponsorships also entail FCA considerations.26-*
Because more health care providers may be billing Medicare for ser
vices provided in the context of a clinical trial, there is an increased
risk that clinical trial sponsorship may implicate the FCA.265 Clinical
trial sponsorship by manufacturers may also implicate the FCA if the
trial involves claims to government payors when: (1) the services are
not Medicare covered services, or (2) the services are Medicare-covered
services, but the sponsor has paid for the services.266 The risk is also
enhanced where payment by commercial or governmental sponsors
un er the clinical trial agreement is not linked to specific costs.267 This
enhances the importance of making sure that any clinical trial agree
ments clearly set forth costs and charges in advance to the greatest
reas
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avoid leaping to the conclusion that a grant is, in fact, a kickback that
should give rise to sanctions.272 In this way, grants create a paradox
for regulators because government enforcement agencies have ac
knowledged that a for-profit company may provide funding to third
parties (including parties other than charitable organizations) even
though there is no direct, measurable benefit to the manufacturer
other than the promotion of goodwill.2™ Government enforcement
agencies, however, expect that the manufacturer can demonstrate that
the grant is a legitimate grant and not a disguised discount or other
inducement.274
The provision of a grant may implicate the anti-kickback stat
ute where the grant benefits an individual or entity who is in a position
to influence the prescription or purchase of products.275 Such a grant
could be construed as a disguised inducement for the recipient to use or
to promote the use of a manufacturer's products.276 For example, such
an interpretation could be appropriate where a "grant" is provided to
cover a routine expense the customer would otherwise incur or substi
tute for a product discount because such "grants" are not really
grants.277
The OIG has offered guidance on how grantors and recipients
can avoid any suggestion of conduct that would violate the Anti-Kick
back statute in connection with the provision of a grant.278
To reduce the risks that a grant program is used improperly
to induce or reward product purchases or to market product inap
propriately, manufacturers should separate their grant making
functions from their sales and marketing functions. Effective sepa
ration of these functions will help insure that grant funding is not
inappropriately influenced by sales or marketing motivations and
that the educational purposes of the grant are legitimate. Manufac
turers should establish objective criteria for making grants that do
not take into account the volume or value of purchases made by, or
anticipated from, the grant recipient and that serve to ensure that
the funded activities are bona fide. The manufacturer should have
no control over the speaker or content of the educational presenta-
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tion. Compliance with such procedures should be documented and
regularly monitored.279
Grants also provide another occasion when conduct that impli
cates the Anti-Kickback statute can also implicate the FCA.280 Grants
may implicate the FCA to the extent that they are perceived as dis
guised discounts.281 To minimize the risk of violating either the AntiKickback statute or the FCA, grant activities should be insulated from
sales and marketing activities.282 In this connection, there several im
portant safeguards that can be taken to assure compliance.283
First, potential grantors should make sure that they are not us
ing grants to obtain new customers or reward existing customers.284
Thus, funding should not be conditioned upon the purchase of a prod
uct.285 A manufacturer may wish to further separate grant-giving from
its business relationships by making information about grants gener
ally accessible, such as by posting information on its website and by
encouraging applications from any qualified person, not just from
those associated with the manufacturer's market targets.286 Readily
accessible information avoids a situation in which the only way an in
dividual or institution could find out about available grant funds was
through contact with a sales representative who is seeking to initiate,
maintain or reward a customer relationship.287
Second, the activity funded by the grant should meet estab
lished criteria uniformly applied to assess similar activities.288 For
example, research funded should meet objective scientific criteria.289
To establish that the grant was provided in accordance with these cri£frant°rs should retain policies or other documentation regarding
( lgi )i ity requirements for grants and the application/approval
process.290
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Third, to further assure that the grant is clearly distinguished
from the grantor's ordinary business transactions, the funding should
not be offered in lieu of a discount or to otherwise provide value to a
customer.291 Consequently, the grantor's sales representatives should
not be the source of information about grants, nor should they promise
grants or otherwise indicate that grants will be provided to fund a par
ticular activity, even if the activity meets all criteria for an award.292
Decisions about awarding grants should be made prior to the activity
and not after the activity to fill funding gaps.293 In short, grants should
not subsidize the routine business operations of the customer.
Fourth, the grant must actually be a grant. Manufacturers
should have no control over the conduct of the activity.294 Manufactur
ers should not influence the protocol or other aspects of research, nor
determine the content of the educational program.295 Along the same
lines, the grant funds should be in a reasonable amount for the pur
poses specified in the grant, and they should actually be used for those
purposes.296 If there are surplus funds after the grant activity is com
plete, such a surplus should be returned to the manufacturer or, with
the approval of the manufacturer, applied to similar activities.

E.

Educational Activities

Academic medicine presents a problem similar to that arising in
connection with the provision of grants. Because they provide both ed
ucation to students and medical treatment to patients, medical schools
and their affiliated hospitals are customers for the manufacturers of
drugs and medical devices as well as providers of valuable informa
tion.297 Thus, when a manufacturer provides financial support for a
medical school's research or educational activities, it could be simply
providing support for those activities, or it could be soliciting business
through what amounts to a kickback.298 The OIG advises that:
While educational funding can provide valuable information to the
medical and health care industry, manufacturer grants to purchasm'
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ers, GPOs, PBMs and similar entities raise concerns under the
anti-kickback statute. Funding that is conditioned, in whole or in
part, on the purchase of product implicates the statute, even if the
educational or research purpose is legitimate. Furthermore, to the
extent the manufacturer has any influence over the substance of an
educational program or the presenter, there is a risk that the edu
cational program may be used for inappropriate marketing
6
purposes.299
The distinction between promotional activities in an academic
setting and purely academic activities is also important in the context
of regulations imposed by the Food and Drug Administration
( FDA") 3oo The FDA distinguishes between (1)
(programs and materials) performed by, or on behalf of, manufactur
ers; and (2) activities, supported by manufacturers, that are otherwise
independent of the promotional influence of the supporting manufacUI?r'
. Pro-ams in the first category are subject to the FDA
prohibition on off-label promotion.302 For example, speakers in sneaker
^
rnUfaCtUrer
have presentations that afl
tirmatively address only approved uses.303 Speakers may only respond
directly to unsolicited questions about off-label uses.30-* By contrast
FDaIh"

3ndr "on-Promotional activities are not subject to
A regulation, even if they receive financial support from a manufacturer of drugs or medical devices.305
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seek to ensure that all CME activities by accredited providers are inde
pendent, free of commercial bias, and beyond the control of commercial
sponsors.!,,s These standards impose several important disclosure re
quirements designed to avoid any appearance of impropriety 309 First
these disclosure requirements apply to anyone involved in developing
any of the content for CME programs, as well as the spouses or domes
tic partners of persons involved in such development.3™ Second any
form of financial support must be disclosed, regardless of whether the
support comes is monetary or in-kind >» Third, a manufacturer cannot
be a joint sponsor of any CME activity along with the organization or
entity that is providing the CME program.3™ Fourth, when a CME
provider does receive some form of financial support from a manufac
turer, the provider must provide extensive and accurate
documentation of the use of the funds to assure transparency 313

In addition to all of these considerations, there are also rigorous
standards for dealing with conflicts of interest. The ACCME standards
prescribe that, with respect to conflicts of interest, the mere disclosure
is not enough to eliminate any impermissible commercial bias; the
ACCME requires that any conflicts of interest arising from be elimi
nated entirely or controlled through the implementation of peer review
safeguards.314 Depending upon how the conflict of interest provisions
are ultimately applied, institutional providers and affiliated physicians
may have their CME involvement limited.315 The risk associated with
funding of educational programs that involve off-label discussions, in
cluding CME programs, can be further reduced if: (1) a manufacturer
provides funding to programs that receive support from a number of
manufacturers; and (2) a manufacturer provides funding to a number
of educational providers (to avoid any suggestion that an educational
provider is dependent upon the manufacturer and will cater to the
manufacturer in developing content).316
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Charitable Donations

The potentially sweeping effect of the Anti-Kickback statute is
so great that even a "charitable donation"317 creates some risk of being
characterized as a kickback. Of course, many health care providers
such as hospitals or physician groups associated with academic medi
cal centers, are also considered charitable organizations.31«
Manufacturers may be solicited for donations because providers will
often look to members of the community or business partners in seek
ing donations as these individuals or organizations are familiar to the
provider. For their participation, manufacturers also have significant
incentives for promoting research, education, and community service
activities through charitable contributions. Problems may arise if the
donee is also a customer of a manufacturer and if there is any sugges
tion that the donation is being offered or solicited as a quid pro quo for
the continuation of the business relationship between the donor and
donee.319 Here again, avoiding liability under either the Anti-Kickback
statute or under tax law depends upon assuring that the charitable
character of the donation is confirmed by independent documentation.
The persons involved in both paying and receiving the donation should
not be the same individuals who are involved in making the decisions
about buying and selling in the commercial dimension of the
relationship.
CONCLUSION

It is no easy task to develop a compliance program for healtl
care services. In particular, one that is well-adapted to the often open
ended requirements of the Anti-Kickback statute and the FCA. Be
cause the business relationships in health care services are ofter
complicated, involving multiple relationships in different contexts be
tween the same two parties, there are few bright-line rules that always
agentsand ^

GaSily COmmunicated

to

managers, employees, anc

The absence of bright-line rules makes it difficult for healtl
care corporations to pursue the adversarial approach to compliance
onranizatlon^pi^16
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Viewing the law as an external constraint and taking an adversarial
approach to compliance means that corporations will try to keep their
conduct as close to the boundaries of the law as possible, minimizing
both their costs and the extent of their compliance. If there are no clear
rules to follow, however, it is difficult or impossible for a corporation
and its employees and agents to have confidence that their chosen
course of action is going to skirt the edges of illegality. When the re
quirements of the law are murky, there is substantial risk that an
official from an enforcement authority might view something as illegal,
even if the corporation thinks that it is lawful. Consequently, with re
spect to the Anti-Kickback Statute and the FCA, it is difficult to rely on
the adversarial approach to compliance programs.
The problems with the adversarial approach make an argument
for viewing compliance as a goal rather than a constraint, at least in
the field of health care services. Because those statutes impose vague
rules, employees and agents cannot be sure of the legality of their con
duct unless they have internalized the operative principles behind the
statute and engaged in the process of trying to apply those principles in
every situation. This kind of approach is exactly what is involved in
treating compliance as an internal goal rather than an external con
straint. The health care services field creates a powerful example of
how and why it can be better to view compliance as a goal rather than
a constraint.
This does not mean that it will be easy to make compliance a
goal rather than a constraint. As a practical matter, it is impossible to
apply the New Governance approach to the health care context because
there is no single agency (or even a small group of agencies) who are
responsible for enforcement and with whom health care providers can
engage in dialogue. Indeed, because a great deal of enforcement au
thority is effectively delegated to private parties who can bring qui tarn
actions that the government may or may not choose to join, health care
providers can never really know where the enforcement action is com
ing from and therefore can never know exactly how to collaborate with
the enforcing authority.
But, even if a pure form of the New Governance approach is not
a practical reality for improving compliance programs in the health
care industry, the concepts behind New Governance still have much to
offer those responsible for developing compliance programs that have
to address the fluid requirements of the Anti-Kickback statute and the
FCA. One of the crucial aspects of the New Governance paradigm is
the idea that compliance programs should be founded upon the com
munication of fundamental legal and ethical principles and of methods
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that individual employees can use to make sound judgments about
lawful conduct in the absence of black-letter rules.320 Perhaps most im
portantly, the New Governance approach involves training employee
to internalize certain legal guidelines, so that they think of compliance
as a goal rather than an externally imposed constraint.321 If a comnl'
ance program cultivates the idea that the Anti-Kickback statute and
the FCA are purely constraints on employee action and that complying
with those statutes involves rote rule-following behavior, compliance
will be manifestly imperfect because employees will inevitably find
themselves in novel situations where the existing frameworks for an
plying the law do not clearly apply. By contrast, if compliance focuses
on communicating core principles and developing independent judeh.16"1' e™Ployees will be far better prepared to deal with the ever
shitting factual circumstances in which they must apply the law.
In this respect, it will be essential for health care compliance
programs to emphasize the collaborative ethos of the New Governance
approach in the relationship between internal counsel, the compliance
'7S' ar"! the mrfrs' emPloyees' and a^nts who must carry out
the day-to-day work of compliance. Those in charge of the compliance
I gram must be in constant communication with employees to learn
about new circumstances in which the law must be applied and^ to con
vey new information about the judicial decisions Ld other legal
tior"nd co lloeCtneW teCtT ^ ^ laW' This kind of communicath?heaith care w^on ^
rr
is the
key to assuring that companies always base their compliance efforts on
tt a. cot?atl°K au°Ut b°th thG l3W itselfand
factual context in which the law must be applied.

ever evolving

To illustrate how useful it can be to build a compliance nropram
S:*:"
?"Va1rrC3 Sck
its associated hospital seek to
hold an education I
physidans at the hospital regarding
developinfresearch rfr
S n®W WayS to use an existing drug. The
FDA has not h
signed t enlurarferrtrr°Ved ^ "eW USeS' the
dereS6areh and to keep the hospital at
the cutting edee^rf
^
show "hysidans howlotrea m»t methods, but, it is not desired to
manufecturei^fthe^rug still
^ in their praCticeS' 1116
paten
develop new uses, so it offers tn^
* protectlon and 1S eaSer to
providing
a
grant
'to
th
.
sponsor
the
educational £^
program by
viding a grant t° the presenters of the program
and by
bIiahin£
321. See mpm SecUon I b'P™ "°te

64'

1623; L°be1' SUpra note 64' at 462-

2017

REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

291

fund that will fund new research efforts by hospital staff and/or med
ical school faculty and students. The fund will be administered by both
the drug manufacturer and the medical school faculty, who will jointv
decide on who will receive the research grants.
a

In this situation, there are three entities interacting- a hospital
its medical school, and a drug manufacturer. But, these interactions
are not perfectly straightforward because they involve multiple roles
for each participant. The hospital is acting as both a customer of the
drug manufacturer and as a partner of the medical school in its educa
tional mission. The medical school is acting primarily in furtherance of
its non-profit educational mission, but its actions also have commercial
value, and some doctors who are on both the medical school faculty and
the hospital staff have a dual role as both educators and commercial
actors. For its part, the drug manufacturer is acting both as a charita
ble contributor and as a commercial actor seeking to develop new
business. When each of these three entities takes an action in connec
tion with the educational program, it will have to be keenly aware of
what particular role it is advancing with that action, and it will have to
be especially careful to distinguish between commercial and non-profit
actions.
None of this can be done unless the individual physicians and
staff who are involved in the program are aware of the multi-faceted
nature of their roles and the differing legal principles and rules that
apply to each facet. And there is no way to construct a compliance pro
gram that can provide advance directives prescribing how each
individual actor should conduct himself or herself in any particular sit
uation. Instead of giving individuals a compliance "script" to follow, the
compliance program for any of the entities involved in this example
must provide individuals with a method for reasoning through the
compliance problems on their own. And, just as important, an effective
compliance program would give individuals a mechanism for engaging
with compliance officers in an on-going dialogue about emerging
problems and solutions.
Finally, there is another reason to view compliance as a goal
rather than a constraint, and this reason is the most fundamentally
important one of them all. The entities that deliver health care services
have an inherent and inescapable obligation to serve the public inter
est. Because most of these entities are organized as non-profits, and
ecause they are necessarily devoted to promoting health and well-beJ^g generally, they cannot be exclusively devoted to maximizing profit.
ey must pursue non-economic objectives, including and especially
t ose defined by law. For this reason, it is not enough for them to view
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compliance with the law as a constraint. Rather, such compliance must
be internalized as a goal. And, to effectively accomplish this internal
ization, it is useful and important for health care entities to adopt
elements of the New Governance approach.

